Abstract
We report 10 laboratory-acquired Brucella infection cases and two S2
vaccine outbreak infection events during 2006-2016. Most
laboratory-acquired Brucella infections were found in southern China, an
emerging area of brucellosis. Microbiologists had a higher risk of
laboratory-acquired Brucella infections, and the identification and
handling of samples suspected of Brucella infection without recommended
biosafety protection was the main reason for the infection. However, the
S2 vaccine outbreak infection events were mainly observed in northern
China, historically an area of human and animal brucellosis. The
majority of infection cases were found among grassroot veterinarians and
workers in animal vaccine production. Therefore, we suggest that
identified suspected strains in biosafety facilities (BSL-3 and BSC) and
abide biosafety practices are compulsory in southern, moreover,
strengthening the preventive awareness of the clinical laboratory staff
and physicians. In contrast, improving personal protection and launch
biosafety education to high-risk of population exposure to S2 vaccine in
northern is recommended.