This paper focusses on Myanmar, where the military has ruled for over 60 years. It gives a historic overview of regime changes under military rule. It then formulates a theoretical conflict model with three poles: the two contestants are the military and the EAOs who compete for the control the government. The government contributes to economic growth but not to civil war. The contestants appropriate natural resources and seek transfers from the government. Controlling the government can shift the balance of resources in favour of either side. A general equilibrium in the balance of power depends on military efficiency and the poverty gap. Empirical evidence shows how the balance of power has fluctuated. Periods of liberalisation have followed severe repression. The model also explains the occurrence of military and palace coups. Coups where more probable when the military was in a weak position. When the democratically elected NLD-led government sought to affirm its autonomy, and especially when it shifted fiscal resources to public health during the Covid pandemic, the military responded by the 2021 coup.